Union of Christian NationsBoard

OVERVIEW

Case: Sanpine v Ecclestia; Ex parte Government of the Union of Christian Nations [2021], UCN Tribunal 6.
Judge: Christadelphians - Chief Justice
Parties: Sanpine - Resident of the Union of Christian Nations & Ecclestia - President, Elder and Director of the Office of Foreign, Legal & Administrative Affairs of the Union of Christian Nations
Case Type: Dispute
Judgement Delivered: March X, 2021

BACKGROUND

On January 20th 2021, Sanpine, a resident of the Union of Christian Nations, filed a case brief regarding the legality of certain provisions of the NationStates Christian Community Church Establishment Act 2021. A telegram was sent by myself, the Chief Justice, to the Elders to appoint a defence counsel to represent the Government. Ecclestia was nominated as the representative of the Government.

The Government's response is detailed below:

The Claimant's final response is detailed below:

The Government's final response is detailed below:

The questions before this Tribunal are:

1. Does this case meet the standard required to be heard by a Tribunal?
2. What is the relationship between the NationStates Christian Community Church Establishment Act 2021 and the Chartered Institutions Act 2020, particularly s3.1 of the former and s4.2 of the latter?
3. Is there a conflict of laws?
4. If so, how should this conflict be resolved?

Note: The following abbreviations shall be used throughout the judgement to ensure brevity and concision.

NSCCCE Act – NationStates Christian Community Church Establishment Act 2021
CI Act – Chartered Institutions Act 2020

Question 1 - Does This case meet the standard required to be heard by a Tribunal?

[1] The test to determine which cases should be heard by the Courts was outlined in [4]-[6] of ' Ecclestia re: Scope of judicial independence and related matters [2020], UCN Tribunal 1.' This test shall be applied to the current case to determine whether it should be heard by a Tribunal of the Union of Christian Nations.

[2] The case brief outlined a question of statutory interpretation thus satisfying criteria 1. The case is substantiated as it references legislation and the submissions discussed a doctrine of common law not yet applied in the Region. The question of how the law applied is not frivolous thus satisfying criteria 2 of the test. In conclusion, this case shall be heard by this tribunal.

Question 2 - What is the relationship between the NSCCCE Act and the CI Act?

Link: Chartered Institutions Act 2020
Link: NationStates Christian Community Church Establishment Act 2021

[3] The CI Act came into force on 27 April 2020. The stated purpose of the act is to ‘provide for the establishment of Chartered Organisations & Government Authorities for the Union of Christian Nations.’ The Act sets out a number of provisions through which these institutions are to be established and operate.

[4] The NSCCCE Act was passed on 13 January 2021. The stated purpose of the act is to ‘provide for the establishment of the NationStates Christian Community Church as a Chartered Organisation in accordance with the ‘Chartered Institutions Act 2020’. There is a clear and established link between the NSCCCE Act and the CI Act.

[5] The CI Act in s1.1 requires that ‘A Chartered Organisation or institution that is authorised by a legal mechanism of the Union of Christian Nations, structured by a charter and has a primary purpose other than regional governance’. In s2.1, the CI Act states that the legal mechanism required to establish a Chartered Organisation is ‘by an act of the legislature’. The NSCCCE Act follows these requirements set out in s1.1 of the CI Act. The NSCCCE Act is an act of Parliament thus satisfying the legal mechanism/act of the legislature requirement. The Charter of the Church is outlined in Articles 1-6 of the NSCCCE Act thus satisfying the Charter requirement. The purpose of the church is stated in s1.1 of the NSCCCE Act which ‘is [for the church] to be a non-denominational, online church which brings together the Christian Community on NationStates and connects everyone to Jesus and the world of God’. As there is no indication from the text or any other source that regional governance is a primary purpose of the church, it also satisfies the primary purpose text. This demonstrates that the link between the 2 acts is strong to the degree that the NSCCCE Act is dependent of the CI Act for its construction and operability.

[6] Ordinarily, statutes enacted by Parliament are operable on a co-equal basis meaning there is a presumption that all statues are equally valid and enforceable without hierarchy. At times, legislation may delegate or grant defined rule-making authority to the Executive or some other authority. In situations such as these the original legislation is called primary legislation and the subsidiary rules or laws are called secondary legislation. This is because the secondary legislation relies on or is dependent on the primary legislation for its legal effect. A classic example is where a Legislature passes a law granting local authorities the ability to regulate parking and issue fines for non-compliance as they see fit. This is an example of primary legislation. Any rule or by-law subsequently made by local authorities which regulates parking and the issuance of fines for non-compliance is an example of secondary legislation as it is dependent on the primary law for its effect and operability.

[7] The CI Act does authorise Directors of Regional Offices (or Elders) to establish Government Authorities by an executive order, thus establishing the CI Act as primary legislation in these cases. It is less clear when it comes to the establishment of Chartered Organisations whether the NSCCCE Act is a co-equal statue with the CI Act, as is the general presumption, or whether it is an example of secondary legislation. The CI Act does not delegate or grant defined rule-making authority for the establishment of Chartered Organisations to a non-parliamentary institution as is generally the case with primary legislation. The CI Act does however restrict the way in which Parliament can legislate for and establish Chartered Organisations which is what happened when Parliament passed the NSCCCE Act. So whilst the NSCCCE Act is not secondary legislation in the strict legal sense, it operates with a high dependency on the CI Act giving the NSCCCE Act a quasi-secondary nature.

[8] This ultimately raises an important question of whether Parliament has the ability to limit or constrain its own legislative power. Legislative power is bestowed on Parliament by the Constitution, therefore, as a general rule, a legislature may not change, limit or constrain its own ability to exercise legislative power or bind any future legislature from doing the same. For example, Parliament could not pass a law saying ‘for 6 months, this body shall not pass any laws for any reason whatsoever’ as this would be a total limit on Parliament to be able to exercise its own Constitutionally bestowed power. It is however different if the legislature retains the ability to change or alter the limiting provision through the usual parliamentary process as this does not fundamentally alter or constrain Parliament’s ability to legislate. For example, Parliament could pass a law establishing a 1 month recess whereby Parliament shall not legislate unless, for example, the President calls for Parliament to reconvene or a majority of members call for the recess to end early.

[9] Whilst the CI Act does constrain the way Parliament may establish Chartered Institutions, Parliament ultimately retains the ability to change or alter the CI Act through the usual parliamentary process. The result is that the constraints imposed on Parliament by the CI Act are valid because Parliament may do away with the constraining provisions just as easily as it agreed to be bound by them.

Question 3 - Does s3.1 of the NSCCCE Act Contradict s4.2 of the CI Act?

[10] The initial brief filed by the claimant, stated that s3.1 of the NSCCCE Act contradicted s4.2 of the CI Act. The defendant’s submission did not dispute this claim and ‘[acknowledged] that… s3.1 of the NSCCCE Act 2021 is inconsistent with the provisions required in s4.2 of the Chartered Institutions Act 2020, which serves as its authorising act’. As the parties agree, there is no need to explore this point at length however, to enhance broader comprehension of the legal analysis employed in this judgement, this Tribunal shall briefly outline the details.

[11] s4.2 of the CI Act says that ‘A Charter may establish a Board of Directors to oversee an institution. Whilst members from other Regions may sit on an institution's Board, residents of the UCN must comprise at least 50%+1 of voting members of the Board.’ s2.4 of the NSCCCE Act establishes a church council by which ‘The Director of Religious Affairs shall delegate the day-to-day functioning of the Church to The Church Council (‘The Council’) which shall be the main leadership body of the Church, ensuring it operates in a way that is consistent with and in accordance with this statute, church by-laws and all other relevant legal authorities’. Whilst not expressly called a ‘Board’, The Council’s responsibilities are analogous to those of a Board, as outlined in s4.2 of the CI Act. s3.1 of the NSCCCE Act establishes how the Board shall be composed: ‘The Council shall have 4 voting members: The director of Religious Affairs of the Union of Christian Nations and 3 other positions selected by the Director of Religious Affairs form among the members of the church. There shall be no more than 2 members from the same region serving concurrently.’ s3.1 makes it impossible for UCN residents to comprise at least 50%+1 of the Council’s membership as required by 4.2 of the CI Act. What we are left with is a situation know as a ‘conflict of laws’.

Question 4 - If a conflict of laws exists, how should it be resolved?

[12] The Claimant and Respondent each presented different methods to resolve the conflict of laws. The submissions are outlined below:

Claimant’s Submission
'That the NationStates Christian Community Church Establishment Act 2021 be struck down and rendered null and void for breaching the provisions of its authorising act.'

Respondent’s Submission
'The government requrests (sic) that the Court applies the doctrine of severability, instead of rendering the entire act null and void. We request that the Court severs the following language from s3.1 of the NSCCE [sic] Act 2021 'There shall be no more than 2 members from the same region serving concurrently'...The newly severed s3.1 of the NSCCE [sic] Act 2021 will then be interpreted in light of s4.2 of the CI Act 2020 which says 'residents of the UCN must comprise at least 50%+1 of voting members of the Board.'
Whilst both of the submissions shall be considered, this Tribunal shall also examine other possible methods for resolutions where appropriate.

[13] I will first address the Claimant’s proposed resolution. The Claimant is, in essence, asking this Court to remove and entire law which was passed by the Region’s Legislature through a democratic, parliamentary process. Much like passing laws, removing them is a process most readily attributed to an exercise of legislative power which the Constitution vests in Parliament. It was discussed at great length in the cases ' Ecclestia re: Scope of Judicial Independence and Related Matters [2020], UCN Tribunal 1' & ' Librerepublic v Ecclestia [2020], UCN Tribunal 2', that the separation of the judicial branch from the legislative and executive branches is strong. It is therefore proper that the role of Courts in removing laws or ‘rendering them null and void’ shall be much more limited and inherently different than that of the Legislature. Any action by a Judge should be an exercise of judicial power which is generally accepted as interpreting and applying the law. For example, the UCN Constitution states in Article 1.1 that ‘This constitution is the highest legal authority of the Union of Christian Nations and all other laws in conflict, to the extent of the inconsistency, shall be null and void.’ If, for example, a law is passed which is inconsistent with the Constitution and a case is brought before the Courts, a Judge will nullify that law. Whilst this may look like the ‘removal’ of a law and have the same effect as if Parliament had repealed it, the Judge’s determination is not legislative but an application of judicial power through the interpretation and application of the law. So whilst the Judiciary does have the ability to render a law null and void, it should be exercised with great restraint and deference to the Legislature with a respect of the strong separation and inherent difference of judicial power from legislative power. Therefore, if a resolution to a conflict of laws can be found that preserves as much of a statute as possible, that interpretation should be preferred as it preserves Parliament’s right to legislate as an independent, co-equal branch of government. With this in mind, this Tribunal will now proceed to analyse whether such an interpretation is possible.

[14] It is a commonly accepted cannon of statutory interpretation in the Common Law tradition that: a statute should not be interpreted so as to be inconsistent with other statutes and that where there is an inconsistency, the judiciary shall attempt to provide a harmonious interpretation, giving effect to both statues. s3.1 of the NSCCCE Act clearly states that there shall be 4 voting members of the Council and that no more than 2 should be from the same region. s4.1 of the CI Act requires UCN residents to comprise at least 50%+1 of the voting members which in this case would necessitate at least 3 UCN residents on the Church Council, which the NSCCCE Act explicitly prohibits. As the language and effect of these provisions are so clearly contradictory, it is the opinion of this Tribunal that a harmonious interpretation cannot be derived.

[15] As established in Upper chantler v Government of Christadelphia [2016] and upheld in subsequent cases, the Judiciary should interpret statues in light of their purpose. The stated purpose of the NSCCCE Act ‘is to provide for the establishment of the NationStates Christian Community Church as a Chartered Organisation in accordance with the ‘Chartered Institutions Act 2020’. As all other provisions of the NSCCCE Act are consistent with the CI Act, it is reasonable to determine that it was the will of Parliament for s3.1 of the NSCCCE Act to be ‘in accordance’ with the CI Act, especially considering the quasi-secondary status of the act.

[16] In the Government’s final submission, it was argued that the Doctrine of Severability should be applied which would eliminate only the offending provision thus preserving the vast majority of the statute and making the statute consistent with the CI Act. In the case of Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. (2020) in the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts said that severability serves as a 'scalpel rather than a bulldozer'. He also stated that '[Judges should] try to limit the solution to the problem, severing any problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact. … [Judges] will presume that Congress did not intend the validity of the statute in question to depend on the validity of the constitutionally offensive provision … unless there is strong evidence that Congress intended otherwise.' Whilst the doctrine, as articulated by Chief Justice Roberts, does preserve the maximum amount of the statue as possible, the doctrine has only been applied in the United States to constitutionally offensive provisions. As the case before us in not regarding a constitutionally offensive provision but a conflict of laws, this Tribunal will now address whether the Doctrine of Severability can and ought to be applied to non-constitutional cases, such as a ‘conflict of laws’.

[17] A hierarchy of laws does exist in the UCN. Constitutional supremacy is expressly outlined in s1.1 of the Constitution and based on the case of Seila Law, the Doctrine of Severability would most certainly apply to cases where a statute is inconsistent with the Constitution. Furthermore, as mentioned in s12.5, executive orders are applicable as primary law ‘where the law is otherwise silent’ and as secondary law for Elders ‘to fulfil their responsibilities’. It only makes sense that the Doctrine would be extended to all law so that the maximum amount of law is preserved whilst simultaneously ensuring the hierarchy of law is maintained. Using executive orders as an example, the Doctrine of Severability could be applied where an executive order conflicts with a primary law, the maximum amount of the executive order can be preserved whilst provisions contrary to the primary law can be removed.

[18] Considering Parliament’s expressly stated intent was for the NSCCCE Act to be ‘in accordance’ with the CI Act, thus giving the act a quasi-secondary nature, it is appropriate, in this case, to apply the Doctrine of Severability. This allows the majority of the statute to be preserved, thus respecting the separation of powers, while resolving the existing legal problem of ‘conflict of laws’ in a way that is consistent with the purpose and intention of the act.

[19] The only offending provision in s3.1 of the NSCCCE Act is the last sentence ‘There shall be no more than 2 members from the same region serving concurrently.’ The requirement that ‘resident of the UCN must comprise at least 50%+1 of voting members of the Board’ as found in s4.1 of the CI Act is operable and unimpeded once the offending provision is removed from the NSCCCE Act. As the NSCCCE Act remains operable without the last sentence, this Tribunal hereby determines that the aforementioned, offending sentence in s3.1 of the NSCCCE Act be severed so as to resolve the conflict of laws, advance the purpose fo the act while preserving the maximum amount of the statue as possible.

This hereby marks the end of the case Sanpine v Ecclestia; Ex parte Government of the Union of Christian Nations [2021], UCN Tribunal 6.